


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NS 3000

WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD

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History is just one god-damned thing after another.
– Brooks Adams

You may not care about the dialectic, but the dialectic cares about you.
– Leon Trotsky

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COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT: This course provides an introduction to war as a political and social phenomenon, and as a force in the international system. It reposes on Clausewitz's dictum that "war is politics by other means." While the course draws upon the academic discipline of history, its purpose is not to produce historians. Rather, historical examples of past wars are studied as a vehicle to sharpen the analyst's ability to consider in a dispassionate manner how military force can be used to achieve a state's political goals and objectives. In other words, this course will challenge analysts to consider how to match ends to means.

Analysts will grapple with the interactive nature of war. For not only must a military commander factor in the actions of the enemy when designing his/her plans. He/she must also craft a military strategy which takes into account the desires of the political leaders, the industrial and morale capabilities of his nation, as well as the assets and liabilities of his/her allies. Analysts must consider how doctrine, technology and logistics can be shaped for maximum military efficiency, within the limits imposed by the political leadership or the industrial/financial assets of the

nation. The point of the examination of these historical case studies is to allow analysts to hone the intellectual tools to deal with the strategic problems that will most certainly arise in future.

Major interrelated themes will be emphasized in the examination of the case studies. These are by no means meant to be a check-list nor an exclusive framework for analysis. They are, however, helpful in their own right and offer points of departure for analysis and discussion. When one plans to win a war (and who *plans* to lose one?), these themes will help suggest what to look for in your strategy, in that of your allies, and of your foes. These themes cannot by themselves supply the keys to victory, for war is the province of contingent factors, what Clausewitz called “fog” which obscures the clearest vision, and “friction” which balks the most perfect plan. The analysts job is to keep an open mind, not be seduced by optimistic assumptions, but to apply judgement based on sound criteria to war’s strategic problems. Themes assist in the formation of that judgement. But war can never be reduced to a formula.

Major themes include:

1. The development of leading ideas about war. Theorists like Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett and Mao tse-Tung have made major contributions to our way of thinking about war, about how to achieve political goals using military force.
2. The mutual interactions of politics, society, and warfare. Clausewitz argues that the behavior of each nation and its capacity to wage war depends on three groups of actors: **the people, the military, and the government**. He refers to this as the “**Trinity**”. The interaction of all the “trinities” of the belligerents defines the particular nature of each war.
 - a. **The People:** supply “primordial violence”, “passion” and “hate” to a war. What value did the populations of all belligerents place on the political objective defined by the government? Did they understand the political goals of a war? Was the objective compatible with their cultural/ religious/moral beliefs? With their economic well being? How much were they prepared to sacrifice to achieve the goal? Were they able to endure a protracted war or the shock of an enemy attack? If not, why not? How did one strategy sustain the morale of one’s own population while weakening that of the enemy’s?
 - b. **The Military:** brings “the play of chance, probability and the creative spirit” to a war. It is “the element of subordination” to the civil power, the “instrument of policy”. Did the military leadership understand the political goal? Did they think military force the best way of achieving that goal? Did they correctly predict the nature of the war on which they embarked? Did they devise a strategy which covered their own weaknesses while exploiting the vulnerabilities of their opponents? Did the strategy target an authentic “Center of Gravity” of the enemy? How carefully were alternative strategies considered? What assumptions did military leaders make about the linkage between achievement of military objectives and achievement of political objectives? Were strategic objectives constantly reassessed? Or did military leaders persist in plans and methods that were clearly not working? How did they react to constraints placed on them by the politicians?

- c. **The Government:** defines the “political aims” of a war. Its actions are meant to be “calculated” and “reasoned”. But were the political aims of a war realistic? Were the military and economic costs measured against the expected political benefits? Did the government seek to make coalitions? If so, what common interests unified the coalition partners? Were the political goals clearly spelled out to the military leaders and the people? To the coalition partners? Did they define strategies which were calculated to retain popular support for the war? Did the political leaders understand the capabilities of the different forms of military power at their disposal? Did they create a government structure that contributed to healthy civil-military relations or did it lead to competition between military leaders and the political elite? Did the political elite impose constraints on the military which impeded victory? Did the result make the political environment more or less stable?
3. The interaction of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war: how well was the strategy selected prior to the war implemented in practice? Did the commander possess the operational and tactical ability to achieve the strategy? Was the strategy “operationalized”; e.g. did the commander allow operational feasibility to dictate his strategy? Was intelligence collected and assessed? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty and chance of war? Was the plan likely to achieve the political goal? The impact of military doctrine on war fighting: Did the military leaders develop a doctrine that integrated technology? Did doctrines provide for the integration of different forms of military power? Or did each service go their own way? Did those doctrines take advantages of one’s own strengths? Were the doctrines compatible with the manpower at one’s disposal? Was the strategy “robust” – that is, could it survive setbacks and failures and still succeed?
4. The allocation of resources: Did the strategy adequately take into account economic, technological, logistical and geographical factors and constraints? How effectively did each belligerent mobilize the material resources at its disposal? Was a strategy of economic warfare, if implemented, effective? Was it integrated into other strategies, or used as a “stand alone”? Do the “biggest battalions” -- e.g. the country with the biggest budget, manpower pool, and industrial base -- always win? If not, how did a smaller country devise a strategy to offset weakness? How was sea power factored into strategy to keep a belligerent country’s economy solvent?
5. The coordination of effort among land, sea, and air forces: Did strategists integrate the different forms of military power in the most strategically effective way? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share a common set of assumptions? Did strategies exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Were joint and combined operations successfully employed? How were resources allocated for fighting different enemies on different fronts?
6. National strategic cultures or styles of war, and their implications for strategic practice: How was the strategy shaped by a state’s society and history? For instance, is there an “American way of war”? If so, what are its fundamental characteristics? How far did “moral”

considerations influence the selection of a policy or strategy? Do democracies develop fighting styles different from those of autocracies? Do autocratically run armies have an operational and tactical advantage over democratic armies?

7. War Termination: In taking the first steps into war, and during the progress, did strategists consider what the last steps could, or might be? At what point did one decide to terminate a war – when they were winning? Losing? Passed the “culminating point of victory”? How did they stop a war once they had achieved their political objective? What conditions did they impose on the enemy? What conditions were the people/ allies willing to accept? Did this prolong the war? Might a change of political goals, or of strategy, have shortened the conflict? Were realistic opportunities for a successful end to the war not grasped? Was the post-war settlement in the long-term interest of the winning side? Did the settlement make the international environment more or less stable?

REQUIRED READING: The following books may be purchased at the exchange:

Joll, James. *The Origins of the First World War*. Longman, 1992. ISBN 0-582-08920-4.

Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton University Press, 1986. ISBN 0-691-02764-1.

Robbins, Keith. *The First World War*. Oxford, 1984. ISBN 0-19-289149-9

Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War*. Indiana University Press, 1973. ISBN 0-253-28029-X

Parker, R.A.C., *The Second World War*. Oxford, 1997. ISBN 0-19-289285-1

Additional readings, included in the Schedule of Classes, are in the Course Reader. Assignments should be done as far as possible in advance of the class in which they will be discussed.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS: This course requires one final take-home examination, plus active and informed participation in class. Web-based discussions will be considered part of class discussion. During the course of the term, each analyst will be asked to post a brief response – no more than five-double spaced pages -- to a question assigned by the instructor, which will serve as the basis for an on-line discussion. This response will account for 25% of your grade; the final examination accounts for 45%. Class participation accounts for 30%. All work is assigned a letter grade from A to F. For purposes of determining your course grade, letter grades are averaged, using the weightings just described, after being converted to the following numerical values:

A = 95 A- = 92 B+ = 88 B = 85 B- = 82 C+ = 78, and so on.

Your final average will be rounded up or down to the nearest letter grade. The standards used in grading papers and examinations are described following the Schedule of Classes, below.

SCHEDULE OF CLASSES

1. INTRODUCTION: THE MODERNIZATION OF WAR -- 9 JANUARY, 2002

The rise of European pre-eminence in warfare was a gradual one. But by the 18th century, if not before, European nations boasted the world's most powerful military forces. For a variety of geographical, technological, intellectual and political reasons, Europe would spawn the major innovations in modern warfare. Armies and warfare became central elements in the consolidation and modernization of European states. Navies projected European power to other continents. Nationalism and the Industrial Revolution allowed governments to harness the full human and technological potential of their nations. This growth in the size and complexity of military forces required the creation and expansion of a class of specialists whose job was to plan and organize for war in peacetime, and direct military forces in time of war.

The consequences of the professionalization of military forces was immense. Professionalization of the military establishment tightened the connection between strategy and statecraft, the employment of the military instrument to realize the goals of the state. Professionalization also heightened the potential for civil-military friction.

This week will have two purposes, one academic and the other technological. Academically we shall attempt to lay the groundwork for the discussions that will follow over the course of the term. We shall discuss the driving forces of war, followed by an overview of the levels of analysis of conflict – strategic, operational and tactical. The principles of strategy formulation should provide the basic tools to help us analyze war on all levels. We shall explore such Clausewitzian concepts as the “Trinity” of people, government and military, “absolute” versus “real” war, “center of gravity” and “the culminating point of victory”. The themes evoked above will be amplified and discussed in the context of historical situations.

The week's second purpose will be to familiarize analysts with the internet tools which will provide the vehicle for much of our interaction this quarter.

Required Reading:

Peter Paret, “Clausewitz” in Paret (ed), *The Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 186-213.

2. NAPOLEONIC WARFARE AND THE MYTH OF DECISIVE BATTLE -- 14-16 JANUARY, 2002

The French Revolution produced dramatic and fundamental changes in the nature of warfare. Prior to the Revolution, European rulers relied on relatively small, long-service standing armies drawn from limited segments of the population. The aristocracy supplied most of the officers while the enlisted came from society's lower classes. Wellington's characterization of British troops in the Peninsula as "scum of the earth enlisted for drink" might be considered an optimistic assessment of the provenance and ambitions of the men under his command. Rulers and statesmen, like Louis XIV, Peter the Great or Frederick the Great, were both ambitious and aggressive. But the limited capabilities of Old Regime armies constrained their ability to achieve political goals beyond the addition of a town or province to their domains. This changed with the French Revolution. In France, the soldier was first a citizen, with the duties and responsibilities of a citizen, not a social outcast. Soldiering was considered part of the duties of citizenship, and military service (in theory, at least) expected to be a moralizing experience. The French Republic tapped into France's vast reserves of manpower and patriotic energy to defeat two great power coalitions sent to crush the Revolution. French armies spilled across the frontiers to threaten the established political and social orders of Europe.

Historians debate whether Napoleon represented the culmination of the goals of the Revolution, or whether his political and military reforms institutionalized some of the more authoritarian and regressive tendencies of the *ancien régime* to pursue his own expansionist agenda. What is certain is that Napoleon perfected and codified a revolution in warfare that forced his enemies to adapt or be crushed. This week will explore such concepts as "decisive victory", multi-front war, and the strengths and weaknesses of the coalitions that fought, and ultimately defeated, Napoleon. Great Britain was Napoleon's most persistent enemy. Analysts will debate how Great Britain used sea power and peripheral operations to sustain their unequal struggle against the Corsican Ogre and ultimately helped to amass the coalition that overthrew him.

Peter Paret looks at the transformation of war from the "Military Revolution" of the late 18th Century, through the French Revolution, and Napoleon's contributions to that transformation. David Gates explores the relationship between sea power and Wellington's successful campaign in the Peninsula. Gordon Craig deals with the political suspicions and military problems experienced by the fifth and final coalition against Napoleon. Strachan discusses the attempts to codify the principles of Napoleon's success by Jomini, one of his ex-staff officers.

Required Readings:

Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 123-42.

David Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer. A History of the Peninsular War*, 28-40

Gordon A. Craig, "Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance against Napoleon 1813-1814"

Hew Strachan, "Jomini and the Napoleonic Tradition," *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, 60-75

Supplemental Readings:

R.R. Palmer and J.A. Colton, *History of the Modern World*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, various editions. Chapters XI & X

Steven T. Ross, *European Diplomatic History, 1789-1815: France against Europe*, Malabar: Krieger Publishing Co., 1981, pp. 25-386.

Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. London: Ashfield Press, 1986. Chapter 5.

William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. pp. 177-218.

David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*. New York: Hamlyn, 1974.

Study Questions:

- a) What were the most distinctive or original elements of “Napoleonic” warfare? What were the sources of Napoleon’s success? Can these be isolated from the personal genius of Napoleon himself? Why were opposing commanders never as good?
- b) Napoleon’s most impressive victories came against Austria, Prussia and Russia during the campaigns of 1805, 1806-7, and 1809. Why was Napoleon successful in these campaigns?
- c) Many of Napoleon’s victories were tactically and operationally stunning. In fact, people often refer to his victories as “decisive”? The enemy army was overwhelmed, and the government sued for peace? But within a few years, if not months, fighting resumed? Why did Napoleon’s victories fail to translate into a stable political result? Why did his opponents keep coming back for more? What does Napoleon’s failure to implement a stable security system in Europe tell us about the relationship between military strategy and political goals?
- d) What strategic alternatives were available to Napoleon’s opponents? Why did it take so long for the rest of Europe to discover effective means of opposing him? Why were the coalitions which formed against Napoleon powerless to defeat him before 1814?
- e) The French navy was relatively weak. But did it matter? Can one make the argument that a European hegemon has no need of sea power? If not, what role did sea power play in Napoleon’s defeat?
- f) Could Napoleon have defeated Britain? If so, how? If not, why not?
- g) Why could Napoleon not win in Spain? What could/should he have done there? What role, if any, did Spain play in Napoleon’s ultimate defeat?
- h) Napoleonic warfare, so dazzling everywhere, proved powerless to defeat Russia. Why? What were the special conditions of warfare in Russia which made victory elusive for the French? Could Napoleon have won in Russia? How?
- e) Why, in your view, was Napoleon eventually defeated?
- f) How well does Jomini’s interpretation of Napoleonic warfare capture the reality? Does he miss or add anything significant?

3. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR – 23-28 JANUARY, 2002

The American Civil War was North America's first experience of total war. Both adversaries initiated hostilities in the belief that the war would be brief, that the opening battles would be decisive, that their opponent possessed neither the stamina nor the will to achieve victory. Very quickly, however, both adversaries realized that war would be long, that unprecedented numbers of men must be recruited for armies, and operations and logistics coordinated over widely dispersed theaters. Despite the North's superior resources, Lincoln had to convince a skeptical and divided people that the preservation of the Union was worth the expense of unprecedented casualties. His task was hindered by his inability to find competent generals to lead his armies and to coordinate strategy over vast areas. The South, though inferior in resources, had the initial advantage of a people determined to pursue secession from the Union, a President with military experience, and in Robert E. Lee a general of operational brilliance.

The Civil War was the first war in which railroads, the telegraph and rifled weapons challenged military leaders to adapt strategy and tactics to the technological innovations of the 19th Century. The democratic character of each regime meant that popular morale and the will to continue was intimately linked with success or failure on the battlefield.

Russell Weigley provides an overview of the war from both the Northern and Southern perspectives. Hew Strachan looks at how technology, speeded up by the impact of the Industrial Revolution on warfare, altered tactics. Martin van Creveld examines how logistics influenced strategic choice.

Required Reading:

Russell F. Weigley, "Napoleonic Strategy: R.E. Lee and the Confederacy," 92-127. "A Strategy of Annihilation: U.S. Grant and the Union," *The American Way of War*, 128-52.

Hew Strachan, "Technology and its Impact on Tactics," *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, 107-129

Martin van Creveld, "When Demigods Road the Rails," *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, 75-108

Supplemental Reading:

James M. McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. pp. 276-862.

Study Questions:

- a) Many new technologies impact land warfare in the nineteenth century, but three above all: metallurgy and precision engineering, telegraphy, and railroads. Each offered solutions to existing tactical, operational, or strategic problems. What were they?
- b) Since the Napoleonic era, new technologies introduced new tactical, operational, and strategic problems, as if to replace those they had solved. What were they?
- c) In your view, what elements if any of Napoleonic warfare were validated by the Civil War? Which elements did that war seem to make obsolete?

- d) If you had been a foreign correspondent writing shortly after the first battle of Bull Run/Manassas in July 1861, how would you have assessed the prospects of the two sides?
- e) Can you identify Centers of Gravity of both North and South? Were they successfully attacked?
- f) Was Lee's campaign to invade the North in 1863 a good idea badly executed, or a bad idea?
- g) What does it mean to call Lee's strategy "Napoleonic"? Do you agree with Weigley's judgment that Lee's strategic approach was self-defeating in the end? What strategic alternatives might have been more promising?
- h) Could the South have preserved its independence? How?
- i) What is new about Grant's strategy compared to his predecessors on the Union side? Could such a strategy have been adopted with comparable success earlier in the war?
- j) In contrast to the American Civil War, the many wars fought in Europe in the middle decades of the nineteenth century are short and limited in scope. How can we explain this difference? What lessons should the next generation of soldiers have drawn from what was, for them, recent military history?
- k)** Compare Lincoln and Davis as war leaders. Who was more adept at making war serve the ends of policy?

4. SMALL WARS AND THE PURSUIT OF EMPIRE – 30 JANUARY, 2002

The international security environment facing today's forces in the post-Cold War era would, in many of its essential aspects, be familiar to soldiers of the last century. A general economic prosperity and the absence of any issues serious enough to provoke a major war caused European capitals to cast their gaze on "Zones of Conflict" beyond the developed world. However, political and military leaders disagreed over how far national interests required intervention to right an injustice or bring order to distant parts. Societies in developed nations acquired strong humanitarian impulses, based on the requirement to sow opportunities for development, both political and economic, in the world's more turbulent areas – a Victorian version of "Engagement and Enlargement". Because war assumed an asymmetrical character in so far as it pitted military forces of technologically advanced societies against those of more primitive peoples, military intervention outside of Europe often appeared to be a "low risk" option. Therefore, military forces of developed nations were assigned the task of fighting "small wars", a general term which in today's parlance would encompass a proliferation of missions to include "Peace Operations", Operations Other Than War (OOTW/MOOTW), "pacification" or Low Intensity Conflict.

Between 1800 to 1878, Europe added over six million square miles to their empires. From 1878 to 1914, a further nine million more were acquired as Italy, Belgium, the United States, Germany, Russia and Japan joined the "old" imperialist powers Great Britain, France, Holland, Portugal and Spain.

At first glance, these "small wars" appeared to pose few problems for imperial forces who enjoyed a huge technological edge over their opponents. As Hillaire Belloc believed, "Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim gun and they have not." In practice, however, the technological sophistication of the invading forces could sometimes work against them. Imperial campaigns were often described as "campaigns against nature", fought over remote and difficult terrain, where modern armies were logistically difficult to sustain. The primitive nature of the enemy, his mobility and local knowledge, the apparent absence of a "Center of Gravity" which could be targeted, turned these into long and grueling campaigns. Commanders discovered that they had to lighten their forces, jettison much of their baggage trains and heavy equipment, and raise native levies, men whose stamina and mobility matched that of the enemy. Moreover, military strategies alone seldom sufficed to bring the enemy to heel. Economic warfare at its most severe was employed by Bugeaud in Algeria against Abd el-Kadir, while in Tonkin, Madagascar and Morocco, Gallieni and Lyautey developed the *tâche d'huile* or "oil spot" methods of conquest which combined the treat of force with the enticement of trade and security.

The first reading by Porch examines the problem of colonial wars in both the pre-industrial and industrial period, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. The second Porch reading looks specifically at the French experience. Weigley examines the American experience in the Indian wars.

Required Readings:

Douglas Porch, "Imperial Wars: From the Seven Years War to the First World War," *The Oxford History of Modern War*, 81-99

Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Paret (ed), *The Makers of Modern Strategy*, 376-407

Russell F. Weigley, "Annihilation of a People: The Indian Fighters," *The American Way of War*, 153-163

Supplemental Readings:

Douglas Porch, *Wars of Empire*, London: Cassel, 2000.

Douglas Porch, *The Conquest of Morocco*. New York: Knopf, 1982.

- Douglas Porch, *The Conquest of the Sahara*. New York: Knopf, 1984.
- Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.
- Colonel C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars. Their Principles and Practice* (third edition). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996.
- Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War*. New York: Random House, 1993.
- Donald R. Morris, *The Washing of the Spears. The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965.
- Robert Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue. The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1965*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.
- Irving Howe (ed), *The Portable Kipling*. London: Penguin, 1982.
- Douglas Porch, *Colonial Wars*. London: Orion Press, 2000. (forthcoming)

Study Questions:

- a) What distinguished colonial warfare from the “conventional” warfare of its day?
- b) Extra-European warfare was often characterized as “campaigns against nature.” What does this mean? What special challenges did it present to the invaders?
- c) What were the advantages of indigenous forces? Their disadvantages?
- d) “Whatever happens we have got/ The Maxim gun and they have not” suggests that modern firepower was the *sine qua non* of European superiority on colonial battlefields. However, pre-industrial armies like those of Wellesley in India and Bugeaud in North Africa (indeed, even Cortés in Mexico) emerged victorious despite being outgunned. What role did technology play in the defeat of extra-European opponents?
- e) Although indigenous forces usually had no problem acquiring modern arms, this seldom brought them victory. Why not? Why could indigenous forces not organize a more effective resistance? What was their problem – poor tactics; inadequate command and control; poor “civil-military relations”? Which opponents did Europeans consider the most difficult to defeat?
- f) The image of the “Great White Army” conquering Africa, Asia and North America is a somewhat misleading one. In fact, European expansion relied on the collaboration of local populations. What were the advantages/disadvantage of this reliance on non-European troops?
- g) How do you account for the relative success of some native resisters like Washington, Simon Bolivar, Abd el-Kadir, Shamil, Samori, or Smuts?
- h) Overwhelming defeats of modern armies by indigenous forces were relatively rare. But there were several – Burgoyne at Saratoga (1778), the French in the Macta Marshes (1835), the British at Kabul (1844), Vorontsov in the Caucasus (1845), Custer at the Little Big Horn (1876), Chelmsford at Isandhlwana (1879), Hicks Pasha on the Nile (1883), Négrier at Lang Son (1885), Baratieri at Adowa (1896), “Black Week” (1899) in the Second South African War. What conditions allowed indigenous forces to inflict such catastrophic defeats on modern armies?
- i) By the last C19th, colonial warfare was looked upon by European and American soldiers as little more than a technical problem to be solved. However, by the 1960s, after insurgent victories in China, Indochina, and Cuba, modern insurgency had come to be seen as extremely effective means of waging war. What had changed?

5. THE NAVAL ARMS RACE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR. 4-6 FEBRUARY, 2002

As colonial empires were being constructed, subtle changes were occurring in the European balance of power. The political unification of Germany and Italy created new power centers in Europe's heartland where before only a fragmented constellation of small states had existed. The German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, ever aware of the threat that a united Germany held for the other nations of Europe, was careful to send the message that Germany was a "satisfied" power. He kept Austria-Hungary and Russia in an alliance with Germany, isolated France, and encouraged Great Britain to bask in its "splendid isolation".

After Bismarck passed from the European scene in 1890, his successors in Germany threw caution to the wind. German leaders clamored for a "place in the sun", insisting that Germany be accorded a deference commensurate with her growing military and industrial might. Suddenly, Europe where states formed brief coalitions to fight wars of short duration like Crimea (1854-56) or the Italian War (1859), felt desperately insecure. Peacetime alliances, arms races, and mass conscript armies became the feature of the European security landscape. Berlin allowed the Russian alliance to lapse. Saint-Petersburg soon found a new alliance partner in Paris, thereby breaking the isolation Bismarck had imposed on France. Berlin's strident assertion that great powers required colonies and large navies to protect them, caught London's attention and eventually enticed her into an *entente* with France and Russia. Europe seemed psychologically primed for war, which came to be seen as a Darwinian test for a nation's fitness to survive on a fiercely competitive continent.

James Joll discusses how the European alliance system, when combined with arms races, seriously destabilized the European balance of power. Bernard and Fawn Brodie describe how the move from sail to steam made navies at once more powerful and more vulnerable. Paul Kennedy discusses the turn-of-the-century debate between Mahan and Mackinder over whether technology favored a sea power or a land power, a debate fuelled by the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Finally, Holger Herwig discusses how Germany's decision to build a large fleet was perceived as a direct challenge to Great Britain's security, touching off a naval arms race between those two countries, on both the quantitative and qualitative levels. Michael Howard discusses how the offensive became the preferred strategy of almost all European armies despite technological arguments and historical precedents that should have suggested caution.

Required Readings:

- James Joll, "Introduction," "The Alliance System and the Old Diplomacy," "The International Economy," and "Imperial Rivalries," *The Origins of the First World War*, 1-7, 34-57, 123-70.
- Bernard and Fawn M. Brodie, "Sea Power is Revolutionized," *From Crossbow to H-Bomb*, 153-67.
- Paul Kennedy, "Mahan versus Mackinder," *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 177-202.
- Holger H. Herwig, "'The New Course,'" and "The Dreadnought Challenge," *Luxury Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918*, 33-68.
- Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914", in Paret (ed), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 510-526.

Supplemental Readings:

- H.W. Koch (ed), *The Origins of the First World War. Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

- Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: The Ashfield Press, 1987.
- John H. Maurer, *The Outbreak of the First World War. Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making and Deterrence Failure*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995.
- George F. Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance. France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War*. New York: Pantheon, 1984.
- Holger H. Herwig, *The German Naval Officer Corps. A Social and Political History 1890-1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- William C. Fuller, Jr., *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. Chapters 8-10.
- Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*. London: Macmillan, 1991.

Study Questions:

- a) The First World War is fought by two coalitions that emerge over a period of twenty years. On what basis do the Great Powers choose up sides? Might other international configurations have produced a more stable result?
- b) Many scholars attribute the origins of the First World War to basic features of the international system itself, and to forces beyond the control of individual statesmen. What might some of these have been? Are these kind of structural explanations helpful in understanding the onset of a war?
- c) How do the tactical strengths and weaknesses of steam-powered ships change the character of naval and maritime strategy in the industrial era?
- d) Alfred Thayer Mahan claimed to be the originator of the expression “sea power.” What did this expression mean to him? Does it mean something different today?
- e) What are the strategic implications of Mackinder's ideas for maritime powers? For continental powers? Does a strategy informed by Mackinder's ideas imply a different kind of navy from one shaped by Mahan? or simply a different approach to using the same ships?
- f) Both the United States and Germany embark upon dramatic naval building programs at the end of the nineteenth century. What strategic and operational considerations shape these decisions? Are Germany's goals and methods different from those of the United States?
- g) How does Germany's decision to build a blue water navy affect the balance of power in Europe?
- h) At least three kinds of military factors can be said to have contributed to the onset of war: arms races, strategic planning, and poor civil-military relations. What sort of weight do these deserve in the overall balance of forces tending toward war?

6. THE GREAT WAR – 11-13 FEBRUARY, 2001

The Great War burst upon Europe at the worst time both technologically and psychologically. While technology favored the defensive, every major army in Europe remained committed to the offensive. Germany opened the conflict with an audacious war plan – the Schlieffen plan. The French attempted to counter it with their Plan XVII which thrust French forces into Alsace and Lorraine. The Russians charged into East Prussia while the Austrians invaded Serbia. None of these war plans achieved the rapid military decision of their design. As during the American Civil War, leaders and nations who entered the conflict fortified in the belief that the opening battles, though bloody, would prove decisive, discovered that no army had the power to break their opponent short of engaging in a grinding war of attrition. This was extremely difficult for the belligerent nations to adjust to. Each side searched for strategies to break the tactical deadlock, weakness that they could exploit – a vulnerable ally, a flank that could be turned by naval power, inducing starvation through blockade, massing unprecedented quantities of artillery, or developing a tactical system that would infiltrate and crack an otherwise solidly held front. Nothing worked. As the populations of the Central Powers and Russia starved, and casualties mounted in horrifying proportions, civil-military relations were placed under severe strain. Like a war addict, Europe was traumatized, but unable to quit.

Keith Robbins provides a concise overview of the war. Colin Gray's article, which is on reserve, discusses how Britain used its sea power to attempt to break the stalemate. Offner examines the impact of the war on the German population, and how their destitution and misery drove the German decision to launch the disastrous U-boat offensive of 1917.

Required Readings:

Keith Robbins, *The First World War*

Colin S. Gray, "Sea Power in the First World War," *The Leverage of Sea Power*, 174-211

Avner Offer, Chapter 5 "Collapse" & Chapter 24 "The U-boat Campaign", in *The First World War. An Agrarian Interpretation*

Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Culture," in Paret (ed), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 527-554.

Supplemental Readings:

Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War*. New York: Basic Books, 1998.

John Keegan, *The First World War*. New York: Knopf, 1999.

Holger H. Herwig, *The First World War. Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Tim Travers, *The Killing Ground. The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Shelford Bidwell & Dominick Graham, *Fire Power. British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1985. pp. 7-148.

Norman Stone, *The Eastern Front, 1914-1917*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1975.

Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Study Questions:

- a) All the Great Powers adopt offensive strategies before 1914. Should any have resisted this general drift? For which (if any) is an all-out offensive in fact the right approach?
- b) Perhaps the most influential military plan of modern times is Germany's so-called Schlieffen Plan. Was it good strategy badly executed, or bad strategy?
- c) What strategic alternatives are left to Germany after the Battle of the Marne? Who possesses the strategic initiative once the initial offensives of the war have petered out?
- d) France launched major offensives in 1915 and 1917. Great Britain also carried out major offensives in 1916 and 1917? Were these offensives strategic blunders?
- e) How do you account for the stalemate on the Western Front?
- f) The Peninsula War contributed significantly to the defeat of Napoleon. Do you think that the Dardanelles campaign might have contributed to the defeat of the Central Powers had it been better executed? Or was it a non-starter in the first place?
- g) Were there any alternatives to a war of attrition? Why not negotiate a peace?
- h) How successfully are new technologies assimilated during the war? Does the fact that fighting is actually going on make it easier, or harder, for armed forces to understand and adapt to new technical possibilities?
- i) The tactics of the last months of the war are significantly different from those of 1916-17. What has been learned? What changes?
- k) Naval theorists anticipated a naval Armageddon in the North Sea. It did not happen. Why not? Was this good or bad from a German perspective? From a British perspective?
- l) The German decision to begin a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 is often considered a strategic mistake. Did Germany have any other realistic strategic options?
- m) What operational alternatives present themselves as means of defeating submarines? Why was the Royal Navy so slow to adapt them?
- n) The senior commanders of the German army after 1918 claimed that they had lost the war only because they had been "stabbed in the back" by civilian politicians and the weakness of the home front. Does Offer's account support or undermine this claim?
- o) German army studies in the 1920s identify the British Navy as the real war-winning weapon. How justified is this claim?
- p) What strategic consequences followed from America's entry into the war? Was it still possible for Germany to win thereafter? Does America's entry change the political settlement that follows Germany's surrender?
- q) Should the Allies have refused to agree to an armistice and continued to fight in 1918?

7. LESSONS LEARNED: STRATEGIC PLANNING BETWEEN THE WARS – 20 FEBRUARY, 2002

Historians are divided over the response of political and military leaders to the challenges of the inter-war years as were contemporaries. One group argued (and argues), that the way the Great War terminated made a second round inevitable. Churchill insisted that World Wars I and II were, in effect, the same war – Europe’s second 30 Years’ War – because the geostrategic problem of Germany’s hegemonic threat was not resolved at Versailles. On the contrary, Germany was the strategic victor of World War I. French Marshal Fernan Foch complained that Versailles had not bought an Allied victory, only a “twenty year truce”, a view echoed by such eminent scholars as Henry Kissinger. A second school, which includes P.M.H. Bell, believes that there was nothing systemic or “inevitable” about World War II. That war was a product of the economic and social dislocation caused by the Depression and the direct consequence of the rise of Hitler, due entirely to contingent circumstances. Who could have imagined, least of all the German people, in the mid-1930s that Hitler was a monster capable of inflicting a war of unprecedented devastation on the world, or that his anti-Semitism would be carried to such horrendous proportions?

So, was war inevitable, and the leaders of the Western Democracies guilty of criminal negligence in seeking asylum in policies of Appeasement which only allowed Hitler to grow stronger? Or, was the world shrouded in a “Fog of Peace” which made it difficult to ascertain a threat? Why was it so difficult to build coalitions to confront Hitler? How did the future belligerents plan for war? What military systems did they choose? How were these military systems crafted to respond to the geostrategic problems of each nation, and to the political goals of their governments?

Bell discusses the political dilemmas confronting the European powers, and their quest to adapt their military organizations to their strategic needs in an era of rapidly changing technology. Parker focuses on the difficulties the British government had of devising an adequate response to Hitler in the face of the reluctance of the British people to go to war, the fear that rearmament would undermine an already weak British economy, the complex interests of the European powers, and the inability to actually know what Hitler’s goals actually were. Strachan discusses the evolution of what came to be known, somewhat inaccurately, as the doctrine of “Blitzkrieg” in Germany. Finally, Weigley examines how military strategists in the United States attempted to integrate strategic doctrine with new technologies.

Required Readings:

- P.M.H. Bell, “The Role of Strategy and Armed Force,” *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe*, 162-200.
- R.A.C. Parker, “Hitler, Germany and the Origins of the European War,” *The Second World War*, 1-20
- Hew Strachan, “Blitzkrieg,” *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, 150-68.
- Russell F. Weigley, “A Strategy of Air Power: Billy Mitchell,” and “A Strategy for Pacific Ocean War: Naval Strategists of the 1920s and 1930s,” *The American Way of War*, 223-65.
- Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare,” in Paret (ed), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 554-572

Supplemental Reading:

- Williamson Murray & Alan R. Millett (eds), *Military Innovation in the Inter-war Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Williamson Murray, *The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1968.

Martin Alexander, *The Republic in Danger. General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defence, 1933-1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Allan R. Millett & Williamson Murray (eds), *Military Effectiveness*. Volume II. *The Interwar Period*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Wilhelm Deist (et.al.), *Germany and the Second World War*. Volume I. *The Build-up of German Aggression*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Study Questions:

- a) How does the international system after 1919 differ from the one that existed in 1914?
- b) No war has ever made a more vivid impression upon its participants than World War One, which suggests that its lessons should have been particularly apparent. What were they? Did they look the same from all sides?
- c) The inter-war period was marked by striking technological innovations in land, sea, and air warfare, including the introduction of recognizably modern tanks, submarines, bombing aircraft, and aircraft carriers (all of which had existed in embryonic form in World War I). What political and strategic considerations guided the development and adoption of these technologies by different powers?
- d) Why was the prospect of war against Japan such a daunting problem for American military planners? What factors shape strategic planning in this theater?
- f) Like soldiers, statesmen also try to learn from the past. What lessons did the crisis of 1914 have for those charged with policy in the 1930s? Were the lessons helpful?
- g) Why was it so difficult for the Western Democracies to build an effective coalition against Hitler in the 1930s?
- h) American isolationism in the 1930s was based in part upon the idea that what was developing in Europe was a kind of civil war, that is, a conflict of ancient origin within a community, into which no outsider could effectively intervene. What features of the European situation might justify such a perspective? How realistic was it?
- i) Would you agree that if the Depression had been avoided, the war could have been, too?
- j) The appeasement of Germany by the Western democracies is routinely ridiculed as intellectually and morally bankrupt. What motivated this policy? What advantages was it intended to secure? What were the alternatives?
- j) Is Japanese conduct in the 1930s comparable in cynicism, aggressiveness, or dangerousness to that of Germany? What does Japan want? Could its goals have been achieved without major war?
- k) What strategic and operational lessons did the Germans draw from World War I? How were they different from those drawn by the Western Allies?

8. THE SECOND WORLD WAR: EUROPE – 25-27 FEBRUARY, 2002

World War II dwarfed in scale World War I. Unlike its predecessor, World War II was truly a global war. A powerful but potentially fragile Allied coalition effectively coordinated their strategy against a constellation of Axis powers who fought discreet wars. This time the Allied goal was clear – Unconditional Surrender. This idea was the brainchild of Franklin Roosevelt, who committed the United States to finish a job that his predecessor Woodrow Wilson had mismanaged at Versailles. However, the irony was that, the closer the Allies came to achieving their goal, the more suspicions began to emerge over the postwar ambitions of each.

Despite the immense power available to the Allied side, a victorious outcome was not inevitable. Allied nations had to agree on their objectives. They had to allocate their resources not only across services, but across allies according to the strengths and weaknesses of each. The selection of theaters in which to fight, and the allocation of resources to those theaters, was a source of bitter conflict among all belligerents. Parker's view of the conflict is concise but provocative. Hew Strachan discusses the links between Germany's war and its allocation of its limited economic resources across multiple fronts.

Required Reading:

R.A.C. Parker, *The Second World War*, 21-71, 95-223, 243-304

Hew Strachan, "Total War," from *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, 169-87.

Michael Geyer, "Germany in the Age of Machine Warfare," in Paret (ed), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 572-597

Supplemental Reading:

Gerhart Weinberg, *A World At Arms. A Global History of World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Alan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, *Military Effectiveness*. Volume III. *The Second World War*. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1988.

Richard J. Overy, *Why the Allies Won*. New York: Norton, 1991.

Richard J. Overy, *The Air War, 1939-1945*. New York: Stein and Day, 1981.

Kent Roberts Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration*. Malabar: Krieger Publishing Co., 1982.

Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.

Study Questions:

- a) Decisive victories are rare in modern war. Germany won some in 1939 and 1940. How do you account for these early successes?
- b) What alternatives, apart from capitulation, are left to Britain after France is defeated? Does Hitler need to fight the Battle of Britain as a sequel to the Battle of France?
- c) What do you think of the idea that no country appeased Hitler more frantically than the Soviet Union, nor paid a higher price for having done so?
- d) Given Hitler's position in 1941, did his decision to invade the Soviet Union show sound strategic judgment? What alternative strategies might the Axis powers have developed to produce a more favorable outcome for them?

- e) What were the chief obstacles to inter-allied cooperation during the Second World War? How well do Britain, Russia, and the United States manage to compose their differences with respect to strategy? To post-war planning?
- f) Assess the strengths and weakness of the Axis as a coalition.
- g) The campaigns in North Africa and the Mediterranean are often criticized as an unnecessary diversion of effort. Why do major military resources get committed in this theater, and what difference do they make to the outcome of the war?
- h) Is “unconditional surrender” an adequate strategic objective around which to organize the Second World War? What, if anything, might have been added to it?
- i) Assess the strategic effectiveness of the Axis in the European Theater.
- j) What risks and trade-offs governed the timing and location of the Second Front in Europe? Should the Allies have invaded France in 1943?
- k) In your judgment, which front, including air and maritime, contributed most to the defeat of the Axis?

9. THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE PACIFIC. 4-6 March, 2002

The war in the Pacific offered particularly daunting problems for the United States. In the first place, it had another war to fight against a murderously efficient foe in Europe, to which it had assigned priority. Second, the Pacific was essentially a maritime war which required a huge investment in naval forces. It necessitated the adaptation of new technologies like the aircraft carrier as well as the development of new skills in amphibious warfare. Third the presence of Douglas MacArthur, whose powerful personality and political connections, placed strains on U.S. strategy and created the potential for inter-service rivalry. The island-hopping campaign became increasingly murderous as, by Okinawa, the Japanese had perfected their defensive techniques. On the other hand, U.S. maritime interdiction had virtually reduced Japan to starvation by the summer of 1945. The decision to drop the Atomic bomb on Japan was, and remains, one of the most controversial strategic decisions of the war.

R.A.C. Parker supplies an overview of the Pacific war. James contrasts U.S. and Japanese strategies.

Required Reading:

R.A.C. Parker, *The Second World War*, 72-94, 224-242

D. Clayton James, "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," in Paret, *The Makers of Modern Strategy*, 703-732

Supplemental Reading:

Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*. New York: The Free Press, 1985.

Saki Dockrill (ed), *From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima: The Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-1945*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Edward L. Dreyer, *China at War. 1901-1949*. New York: Longman, 1995. Chapters 6 & 7.

Meirion and Susie Harris, *Soldiers of the Sun. The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*. New York: Random House, 1991. pp.201-472.

Edward J. Drea, *MacArthur's Ultra. Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992.

Study Questions:

- a) The Japanese attack on the British Empire and the United States in December 1941 is considered a classic case of deterrence failure. Why did the foreign policy and strategic steps taken by Britain and the United States fail to deter Japan?
- b) What were the strategic objectives of Pearl Harbor? Why were they not fully achieved? Why should this attack have led Germany to declare war on the United States?
- c) What was Japan's theory of victory in the war against the United States? Did she ever have a chance of winning against the United States? If so, how might she have used her fleet better?
- d) The American war against Japan is waged initially along two axes, of which the northern one (via the Marshalls and Marianas to Iwo Jima and Okinawa) had long been foreseen. The southern campaign waged by forces under Douglas MacArthur (via the Solomons and New

Guinea to the Philippines) has accordingly been regarded by some as a peripheral operation, like the North African and Mediterranean campaigns in Europe. Was it? If it was, does that make it a bad idea? Might Japan have taken better advantage of this division of American forces?

- e) Do you believe that the United States might have better use of the CBI theater to defeat Japan?
- f) The strategic air campaigns against Germany and Japan are often characterized as war crimes, on the (not implausible) grounds that international law, then as now, forbids the deliberate killing of non-combatant civilians. Why were these morally suspect methods used? Do they vindicate the hopes of strategic air power theory before the war?
- g) How do you react to the proposition that the air war against Japan was basically an expression of “sea power” rather than “air power”?
- h) “Total” wars, like “small” wars, sometimes appear to be exceptions to Clausewitz’s proposition that war is “merely the pursuit of policy by other means.” Does warfare remain a political instrument in the last years of World War II, or has it become something autonomous? Does total war have characteristic operational and tactical means?
- i) Was the decision to drop the Atomic bomb on Japan justified? What other ways might have induced Tokyo to surrender? Why did Japan, in fact, surrender?

10. REVOLUTIONARY WAR. 11-13 MARCH, 2002

As World War II drew to a close, what came to be termed “Wars of National Liberation” seemed to explode in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina and Malaysia. The fragile wartime alliance between Nationalist and Communists collapsed into competition focused initially on Manchuria, but eventually spreading throughout the country. Soon, many areas of the world including Africa and Latin America were engulfed in a late twentieth century version of “Small Wars”. When C. E. Callwell had written his *Small Wars* at the turn of the century, he treated these primitive conflicts virtually as technical problems to be solved. T.E. Lawrence, the hero of the “Arab Revolt” against the Turks, had suggested at the close of World War I that, in the right conditions, “the guerrilla always wins.” In the post-World War II world, Lawrence’s prophesy seemed to be born out with a vengeance. Unlike these earlier versions of “small wars”, the indigenous populations appeared to have discovered in a combination of communism and anti-imperialist nationalism an ideology capable of binding diverse groups into a solid coalition against the imperial powers. In Mao’s doctrines of “Revolutionary War”, they appeared to have discovered strategies capable of defeating technologically sophisticated conventional forces.

Although there are many revolutionary wars that could be explored, the wars discussed this week will focus on Vietnam. Baylis gives an overview of the meaning of revolutionary war. Michael Carver examines the antecedent to the Vietnam War, the French struggle to retain Indochina after World War II, a struggle that collapsed at Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954. Finally, other writers will discuss why the United States failed in Vietnam.

Required Reading:

- John Baylis, “Revolutionary Warfare,” in Baylis, Booth & Garnet, *Contemporary Strategy*, 209-232.
- Michael Carver, “Indo-China,” *War Since 1945*, 101-20
- Russell F. Weigley, “Strategies of Action Attempted: To the Vietnam War,” *The American Way of War*, 441-77.
- Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Recovery from Defeat: The U.S. Army and Vietnam,” in George J. Andreopoulos and Harold E. Selesky, eds., *The Aftermath of Defeat*, 124-42.
- George C. Herring, “The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley, 18 October-24 November, 1965,” in C. E. Heller and W. A. Stofft, (eds), *America’s First Battles, 1776-1965*, 300-26.

Supplemental Reading:

- Daniel Moran, *Wars of National Liberation*, London: Cassel, 2001
- Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1996. Chapter 6.
- Eric Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat. The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
- William J. Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.
- Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986.
- George C. Herring, *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*. Novato: Presidio Press, 1982.

Niel Sheehan, *A Bright and Shining Lie*. New York: Random House, 1988.

Harry G. Summers, Jr. *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1981.

Francis West, *The Village*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

William Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*. New York: Dell, 1980.

Study Questions:

- a) The wars in Indochina (as in China & Korea) were both rooted in the conditions under which the Second World War in Asia ends. Could these subsidiary conflicts have been avoided if greater foresight had been shown at an earlier stage?
- b) To what extent do the problems of counter-revolutionary warfare, as encountered by the French in Indochina, resembles those of colonial warfare a century earlier?
- c) Despite fighting with limited resources far from home, the French fully expected to win their war in Indochina. What is their theory of victory, and why do they fail to realize it?
- d) Had you been advisor to President Kennedy in 1961, what course of action would you have recommended for the United States in Vietnam?
- e) What were North Vietnamese political objectives? How well did North Vietnamese strategies target U.S. centers of gravity and vulnerabilities?
- f) The United States, having witnessed the French experience in Indochina, was confident that it could win easily where its predecessor had failed. On what was this confidence based? What was the U.S. theory of victory in Vietnam?
- g) Escalation and attrition are deliberate elements of American strategy in Vietnam. Why are they adopted? Both, in retrospect, tend to be regarded as categorical errors, to be avoided in all circumstances. True?
- h) Did the United States really “win every battle” in Vietnam, as is often claimed? What are we to make of this astonishing fact, if true?
- j) Why did the United States lose in Vietnam? Bad strategy? Bad operations? Political constraints? Lack of support from the American public?
- k) In your view, could the United States and its South Vietnamese Ally have achieve their political objectives in Vietnam? If so, how?

10. THE GULF WAR & WRAP-UP. 18-20 March, 2002

Saddam Hussein posed a challenge to the “New World Order” proposed by President George Bush. The American President successfully amassed a formidable coalition to fight and defeat the Iraqi dictator. However, observers have noted that, while Bush was voted out of office, Saddam remains in power. How does one explain this outcome which seemed so unlikely as the Allied forces marched into Kuwait? Were Allied goals clear? Was everyone on board? Was Allied strategy flawed? Or might the lesson that one takes from the Gulf War is Clausewitz’s dictum that “In war, the results are never final”?

Recommended Reading:

Michael R. Gordon and Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1995.

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. 211-253.

Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. Simon and Schuster, 1996, Chapter 10.

Final examination distributed 22 March. Completed examinations are due by COB on 27 March, 2000.

ESSAY WRITING GUIDE

You will be asked to write an essay this term to post on the internet, as the basis for a discussion by other analysts. You should keep several things in mind when composing the essay.

1. The essay is not meant as a research paper, but your own analysis of the question.
2. Do not repeat history or tell a story. The other analysts will have done the reading and will know the general background. If you have any doubt about what the questions asks, see the professor.
3. The paper is meant to be five pages, or roughly 1,250 words. Make your points concisely and keep your arguments short.
4. Formulate a **Thesis** and state it in your opening paragraph. The thesis is the answer to your question, shortened to one or at the most two paragraphs. This will guide the organization of your material. It should be complete and able to stand alone. It should state your main arguments in the order that you intend to make them. It should also deal with counter-arguments. You should take the counter-arguments on because, if you do not, your fellow analysts certainly will.
5. The conclusion of your paper should mirror your thesis. If, on completing your paper, you find that your conclusion and thesis do not agree, then perhaps you should adjust your thesis.
6. A poorly organized or sloppily presented paper detracts from the quality of your argument. Pay attention to spelling and grammar; errors might confuse and distract the reader from the content. Essays should be double spaced, in paragraph format, 12-point font.
7. Plagiarism is against College regulations and may result in expulsion. You are required to give credit when using someone else's **words** or **ideas**. Direct quotations must be surrounded by quotation marks. Footnotes need not be added at the end. Annotation next to the pertinent passage is sufficient, ie: (Geyer, 572). Facts or dates need not be annotated.

GRADING STANDARDS FOR PAPERS AND EXAMINATIONS

1. “A” [Excellent] Paper

An “A” paper is a superior effort, presenting a demanding argument with depth and clarity. It displays a firm, independent command of complex material, and most or all of the following characteristics:

- 1.1 The introduction avoids flat, lifeless, or obvious statements, and presents the central idea or thesis in a way that engages the interest of the reader.
- 1.2 The conclusion is revelatory or suggestive rather than simply repetitive. It goes beyond a summary of what has already been said to clarify or heighten its significance.
- 1.3 Supporting evidence is specific, relevant, and sufficient to justify the conclusion.
- 1.4 The argument is free of logical fallacies, and demonstrates a thorough grasp of the issues at stake. Judgments and conclusions are clearly stated, and include appropriate recognition of the degree of tentativeness they may involve. Counter-arguments and alternative interpretations are fully acknowledged and weighed fairly.
- 1.5 The style is precise, idiomatic, and rhetorically effective, meaning that it is well-suited to persuade an intelligent reader.
- 1.6 Paragraphs are tightly organized, and transitions between them are smooth and logical.
- 1.7 Errors of grammar, spelling, and punctuation are few. Footnotes and other apparatus are formatted correctly and used appropriately.

2. “A-” [Very Good] Paper

A very good paper must possess some elements of a truly excellent paper, even if it falls short in others. Most such papers tend to be strong on content, but somewhat weak in presentation. This weakness typically manifests itself in one or more of the following ways:

- 2.1 The introduction and conclusion may simply mirror each other. That is, while they may present the main argument of the paper clearly, they also leave the reader with the impression that little has been learned in between.
- 2.2 The supporting evidence may not always be relevant to the main argument. In a very good paper, however, such digressions must be of modest proportions.
- 2.3 An A- paper may not demonstrate complete command of all the issues it raises, but it must be free of gross logical fallacies, and reasonably attentive to counter-arguments and alternative interpretations. In contrast to an excellent paper, however, the reader may still feel that something more needs to be said.
- 2.4 The language and style of a very good paper may occasionally be flat or repetitive.
- 2.5 Transitions between paragraphs, although generally natural and logical, may sometimes be awkward or misleading.
- 2.6 The mechanics of a very good paper may reflect a higher degree of carelessness than an excellent paper, or a faulty command of the details of paper preparation. The overall impression, however, must still be strictly professional.

3. “B+/B” [Good to Average] Paper

A grade of B+ or B is indicative of normal and acceptable graduate-level work, the difference between them being one of degree. Such a paper need not be especially striking or original, but it must still display workmanship, competence, and clarity. Its subject, although less complex or engaging than a

very good paper, must be non-trivial, and it must be treated in a way that demonstrates an understanding of the basic facts. In addition:

- 3.1 The central idea or argument must be reasonably specific, appropriate to the scale of the paper, and clearly stated in the introduction. This idea or argument must provide the main focus throughout.
- 3.2 Assertions, judgments, and conclusions must be plainly stated. Supporting evidence may sometimes lack concreteness or relevance, but not to the point where the main argument is undermined.
- 3.3 A good-to-average paper may contain some faulty reasoning, but it must not rely on faulty reasoning for its conclusions. Even if the argument is not entirely convincing, in other words, it must still be plausible and consistent with the evidence presented. If alternative points of view are not fully explored, neither are they totally ignored.
- 3.4 Paragraphs must be coherent, and transitions between them, while not invariably smooth, must not be disorienting.
- 3.5 The language of a good-to-average paper must be free of slang and jargon, and generally idiomatic. Words must be used properly and consistently.
- 3.6 The mechanics of a good-to-average paper may be faulty in various ways, but they must not present a barrier to understanding, or call the credibility of the author into question. Errors of spelling, punctuation, and grammar, even if numerous, must be incidental. A paper on the Cold War that repeatedly misspells Eisenhower's name cannot be considered even average work.

4. “B-” through “F” [Below Average] Papers

In graduate courses, a grade below a B indicates that a paper lacks, in some degree, the basic attributes of average work. The subjects or contents of such papers may simply be too general or inconsequential to meet the demands of the assignment. In addition, “C” papers display at least one, and “D” or “F” papers more than one, of the following serious defects:

- 4.1 The introduction may fail to establish the main point of the paper. Or, if a central idea is presented at the start, the rest of the text may wander off from it in confusing and unpredictable ways.
- 4.2 The conclusion may introduce irrelevant issues or confounding information; or bear only marginally on the main argument.
- 4.3 The supporting evidence may include a large proportion of clichés, generalities, or irrelevancies. Unsubstantiated assertions and faulty reasoning may call the credibility of the whole paper into question. In contrast to an average paper, which may not be entirely convincing but is still plausibly and seriously argued, a below-average paper will be quite unconvincing. Logical errors will not be incidental, but central.
- 4.4 Paragraphs may lack internal unity, and transitions between them may be misleading or non-existent.
- 4.5 The mechanics of below-average papers may be notably sloppy, including significant deviations from standard English usage.